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Colombia:
social capital, social 
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development in Cauca
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M odern development theorists have repeatedly argued that 
the associative networks constructed by civil society influence countries’ 
economic growth processes by correcting aspects such as failures of 
the market and of democratic governance resulting from the operation of 
public policies. In the case of a region such as the Department of Cauca, 
situated in the south-west of Colombia, a profusion of social movements 
and collective action has not been matched by good economic results, by 
comparison with what has been achieved elsewhere in the country with 
similar or lower levels of social organization. The present paper sets out to 
specify the categories involved in this phenomenon in the light of the region’s 
cultural peculiarities, which make it a crucial case study for understanding 
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Over the past 15 years, the developing world and 
Latin America in particular have experimented 
with a wide range of policy and reform styles in the 
effort to speed up economic growth, reduce poverty 
and maintain democratic governance. To achieve 
these objectives, most countries acted almost as one 
in adopting the policies comprising the so-called 
“Washington Consensus”, whose recommendations 
included matters like the defence of property rights, 
macroeconomic stability, support for the free market 
and trade integration (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 
2006). The results were not entirely encouraging, 
but nor were those of  the former statist model of 
inward-looking growth, at least when set against the 
goal of catching up with the societies of Europe and 
North America.
Although packages of measures were often driven 
by the same approaches, the scope and quality of 
public policies were not uniform. Consequently, there 
is a question that repeatedly comes up in research 
in this field: why have some countries or regions 
managed to adapt their policies quickly to changing 
external circumstances, or innovate when policies are 
unsuccessful, while others have reacted slowly and 
with great difficulty, or kept unworkable measures 
in place for long periods?
In any event, the experience of the 1990s made it 
clear that the complexity of development required a 
new attitude towards crucial elements such as economic 
growth that took account of links to political stability 
and institutional solidity, which are given much of 
their significance by the existence of a civil society 
that actively concerns itself  with the defence of the 
public sphere. Indeed, multilateral organizations have 
expressed the view that the performance of institutions 
has major implications for the countries of the South. 
Because of this, since the mid-1990s organizations such 
as the United Nations Development Programme (undp) 
(Alonso, 2007) have adopted the “good governance” 
approach as a strategy emphasizing the importance of 
political participation, a leading role for civil society 
organizations that are able to make their voices heard 
and the role of the State in promoting human and not 
just economic development (dnp, 1995).
However, research into the determinants of 
good governance, i.e., the phenomenon whereby 
symbiotic relationships are generated between 
the State, society and the market, has been giving 
increasing prominence to the concept of  “social 
capital” as a catalyst for public and private efforts to 
promote well-being, which for many people has meant 
displaying attitudes of collective collaboration that 
provide the basis for the trust needed to invigorate 
economic transactions and ensure the viability of the 
institutional order (Fukuyama, 2004). Fertile though 
the concept is, however, with its virtually limitless 
variety of  applications, there is still no consensus 
as to its theoretical meaning or methodological 
importance. Nonetheless, a minimum of agreement 
on this point is essential to give meaning to economic 
research and examine some of  the elements that 
explain the sources of endemic distortion in markets 
and prevent resources from being used optimally to 
achieve well-being, the result being the kind of major 
regional differences we see in the development of the 
Department of Cauca.
This department in the south-west of Colombia 
is one of the country’s poorest. In 2000, Cauca was 
economically worse off  than any of  the country’s 
other 24 departments other than Chocó, with 77.2% 
of its population below the poverty line and 39.7% 
below the indigence line. The situation was much 
the same in 2005 when, according to the National 
Administrative Department of  Statistics (dane), 
33.6% of the department’s population was below the 
indigence line and 46.4% of households had unmet 
basic needs, compared with a national average of 
27.6%. The provision of  public services in Cauca 
(drinking water and sewage) is well below the national 
average (56.3% compared to 65.3% nationally). There 
is also an ongoing armed conflict and violence right 
up and down the region, this being mainly the work of 
outlawed armed groups exploiting the inaccessibility 
and intricate geography of the department.
  This article is part of  the results of  the research project 
“Determinación del capital social, las redes de asociatividad y 
la sustentabilidad del crecimiento en el departamento del Cauca 
en el período 2006-2007”, supported by the Office of the Vice-
Chancellor for Research and the Department of Economics of 




CoLoMBiA: soCiAL CAPitAL, soCiAL MovEMEnts AnD sustAinABLE DEvELoPMEnt in CAuCA
•  RAúL CoRtés LAnDázuRy AnD MónICA MARíA sInIstERRA RoDRíguEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 9  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 9
About 21% of  the inhabitants of  Cauca are 
indigenous, with 84.5% of them living in reservations; 
there are 84 reservations covering a surface area 
of  519,850 hectares, equivalent to 17.7% of  the 
departmental total (dnp, 2007). These reservations 
were originally created by the Spanish to protect the 
indigenous people, who governed themselves under 
an independent political authority called the cabildo. 
The land on these reservations is owned in common 
by the group inhabiting it, which holds formal title. 
This structure of land ownership, together with the 
maintenance of native languages and cultural traditions 
and the protection of  communal territory, limits 
the scope for carrying out impersonal transactions, 
trading property rights or increasing market size 
and perpetuates the old institutional structure of 
government and ways of doing politics, generating a 
closed group effect or “embeddedness” in the sense 
used by Granovetter (1985) which stifles the dynamic 
of production.1
In the historical development of the Department 
of Cauca, the dominance of extractive industries has 
proved an obstacle to progress towards a republican 
way of life and the benefits of new political institutions. 
This was to become the main formal cause of the 
disadvantaged economic situation of Cauca, whose 
origins go back to the colonial era. The administrative 
and political structure of Cauca was clearly shaped by 
the colonial relationship that linked the newly conquered 
territories to the Spanish Crown. This relationship of 
dependency meant that the colonized peoples were 
deprived of the ability to take decisions about their 
own lives, territory, beliefs and culture. The Spanish 
Crown created hierarchical structures of government 
that sought to protect their own interests and formed 
networks of patronage which were confined to the 
geographical areas where their writ ran and whose 
purpose was to control and dominate the workforce 
(slaves) and land.
“Cauca introduced a particular variant of the 
exercise of State power that was aristocratic, religious 
and racist in character and that, within historical 
memory, has produced particular characteristics in 
the exercise of dominion. Until the late nineteenth 
century the capital, Popayán, was home to a number 
of the leading families in the Colombian slave trade, 
1 These approaches to politics are clearly reflected in the actions 
of the Indigenous Social Alliance political party that entered the 
Colombian Congress after the new national constitution came 
into effect.
most of whose victims were black. It was there too 
that the most concentrated racism against black and 
indigenous people was found, and the consequences 
can be seen to this day” (Jaramillo, 2007, p. 4). But the 
colonial inheritance did leave room for the institutions 
of the indigenous inhabitants, the group that has been 
perhaps most vehement in resisting exclusion and the 
concentration of power in the hands of those who 
have taken on the mantle of the old encomenderos. 
Paradoxically, the current indigenous institutional 
structure is based on the reservation and the cabildo, 
concepts introduced by the Spanish during the 
colonial period, but resignified and appropriated by 
the indigenous peoples (Caviedes, 2001) when they 
saw the opportunity to generate in them a political 
authority that would provide recognition and validation 
for their special ethnic characteristics.
Episodes of rent-seeking behaviour during the 
colonial period not only show the ineffectiveness 
of the government machinery and legal framework 
when it came to creating a system posited on the 
clear specification of property rights (over resources 
such as labour and land), but reveal a tradition under 
which the law was used whenever convenient to 
exercise exclusionary power, and not as a set of rules 
facilitating interaction. This issue has obviously been a 
constant in the evolution of Latin America, as shown 
by Naritomi, Soares and Assunção (2007) for the case 
of Brazil and De Soto (2001) for that of Peru. Thus, a 
description of the Colombian situation that focuses on 
the dynamics generated in the Department of Cauca 
not only reaffirms the need to strengthen economic 
and political institutions but calls into question the 
effectiveness of social movements when it comes to 
creating social capital capable of  providing public 
goods and generating development.
A strong civil society, which has been a feature of 
some episodes of Cauca regional history, with social 
movements led by indigenous groups, would allow 
efficiency, growth and legitimacy to be combined, while 
at the same time banishing the conflict of values in the 
modern State (late capitalism), torn as it is between 
promoting efficiency, encouraging private activity and 
achieving legitimacy with strategies for welfare that 
constrain the “invisible hand”.
The problem so far has been that despite the 
kind of  social cohesion evinced by its indigenous 
movements, the links enjoyed by its political elites 
at the centre of national decision-making (Bogotá) 
and the existence of certain comparative advantages 
associated with the availability of natural resources, 
152
CoLoMBiA: soCiAL CAPitAL, soCiAL MovEMEnts AnD sustAinABLE DEvELoPMEnt in CAuCA
•  RAúL CoRtés LAnDázuRy AnD MónICA MARíA sInIstERRA RoDRíguEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 9  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 9
Cauca does not have a privileged position in regional 
and national development, and nor has it improved 
the living conditions of its inhabitants. There seems 
to be something going on with the cooperation 
networks of civil society that suggests the existence 
of  a collective infrastructure torn between forces 
capable of generating synergies in development policy 
formulation and implementation and others that are 
more hidebound and suspicious of progress.
In view of all this, we shall first embark upon 
a theoretical and methodological discussion about 
the functionality of social capital as a factor in our 
understanding of the dynamic of regional development. 
We shall then proceed to a case analysis of  the 
history of popular movements in the Department of 
Cauca, pointing out the strengths or weaknesses of 
associative action. Thirdly, we shall relate the social 
structure derived from the colonial period to the 
current development conditions of the municipalities 
in the department, before lastly giving a general 
overview of the work of civil society organizations 
in the mid-2000s.
II
social capital in the development fabric:
a theoretical introspection
Social capital really does have the capacity to give a 
productive application to the associative resources 
embodied in the different social networks to which 
the members of a group have access, but it entails the 
complexity of linking individual interests to that of 
the collectivity. The early analyses of social capital 
that have now become the classics of  the subject 
referred to the importance of personal relationships 
when examining economic systems. This is true of 
the treatment given to the subject by Coleman (1990) 
from a structuralist perspective, Bourdieu (1980) 
from a culturalist perspective and Granovetter (1985) 
from an institutionalist perspective. However, it is in 
Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) that we find 
the acknowledgement of a valid relationship between 
social capital and economic development, and its ability 
to bring about change in conditions of welfare, in 
Making Democracy Work; it would later be recognized 
by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank as a 
vital instrument in development policy.
Social capital can be understood as the 
characteristics of  life in society —social networks, 
rules and trust— that enable participants to act 
more effectively in association to achieve shared 
goals (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, p. 167). 
This set of  characteristics expands the range of 
opportunities available to people in a community, thus 
increasing the benefits of  associative participation. 
Furthermore, a study carried out in Italy showed 
that social capital was capable of  changing and 
developing over time, evidently meaning that a 
region’s development level could change if  its social 
capital were altered from outside.
Nonetheless, the proliferation of studies on the 
subject and the complexity consequently involved in 
engaging conceptually and methodologically with 
this intangible resource as contexts change have led 
to a growth of interest in the different forms social 
capital assumes, ranging from individual capital, 
embodied in dyadic contracts (i.e., contracts between 
two people, with egocentred networks), to group social 
capital in the form of stable teamwork with a leader 
who organizes and is recognized by his or her peers. 
What we are interested in is external social capital, 
characterized by the construction of  community 
working relationships in the form of a “partnership” 
between State and non-State actors in a region, and 
between regions, as a result of which different resources 
are linked together to improve the adaptive efficiency 
of the economic structure and forge agreement on 
social coordination mechanisms.
In this way, the role of  networks becomes an 
essential precursor of  governance and economic 
stability.2 But how can we calculate an asset that 
is evidently intangible, when public information is 
limited, there are geographical barriers to connectivity 
2 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1992) developed a very 
detailed classification of the steps involved in the ascent to political 
development and its correlation with economic development, 
arguing that the final step in modernization was the existence of a 
participatory and proactive citizen body attuned to civic culture.
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and political agitation has been systematic? Does it 
even make sense to discuss this topic in microlocal 
contexts that are preponderantly rural and have little 
human capital —this being largely confined to the 
urban societies of the country’s north? And again, 
what is the point of doing so if  we start by assuming 
a society like that of Cauca, all but fractured by the 
confrontation between powerful landowning local 
political elites and the leadership of emerging groups 
such as communities of indigenous people, campesinos 
and Afrodescendants?
Undoubtedly, the best way to answer these 
questions is to draw some distinctions regarding the 
role of recent collective actions in Cauca in determining 
social capital in the face of the changing development 
model of the late twentieth century.
III
some background on the history
of popular movements
Given the explanatory potential of social capital as 
a factor needed to invigorate economic transactions 
and underpin the institutional order, there has been a 
tendency to argue that it exists in those places where 
collective agitation has led to a proliferation of social 
movements (Ruiz, 2004; Villar, 2003). Indeed, if  we 
are to believe some of  the political and economic 
development literature (Ray, 1998; Valles, 2000; 
Blomstrom and Hettne, 1990), Cauca society today 
is in a stage of economic and political modernization 
insofar as the characteristics of these kinds of collective 
action, generally associated with advanced nations, 
evince developments such as an upsurge of  post-
materialist demands, i.e., of  those requirements in 
society, based on symbolic values and the need for 
esteem, recognition and self-realization, associated with 
access to a range of (formerly imperceptible) goods 
such as ethnic, racial or sexual identity (see table 1).
Indeed, it could be said that the dynamic of social 
movements in the Department of Cauca since the 
second half of the last century confirms the existence 
of this social asset. However, theories about these 
characteristics do not accord with the classic definitions 
of social capital (Coleman, 2001; Putnam, Leonardi 
and Nanetti, 1993; Bourdieu, 2001; Dasgupta, 2004), 
which associate it at first sight with the strengthening 
of collective networks leading to economic progress, 
institutional respect and human capital formation.
But then, what are the characteristics of  the 
collective action of civil society organizations in the 
Department of Cauca that are capable of generating 
social capital? Is there any relationship between the 
social mobilization of the 1990s and the generation 
of social capital?
One promising way into the subject is to create 
a theoretical matrix to explain the relationships 
between social movements and social capital in Latin 
America and thereby reach an understanding of the 
department’s dynamic.3
It is thus worth beginning by defining “collective 
action”. It is the phenomenon (Galvis, 2005) that 
aims to preserve or modify the position and interests 
of each group in society. Indeed, such action is often 
coordinated among a number of individuals in the 
same group who share the same position and the same 
plans and organize themselves on a fairly centralized 
basis. The matter does not end there, however, as the 
nature of their motives differs.
Some authors (Valles, 2000; Mariñez, 2001) 
have tried to reduce theories about the subject to a 
basic classification by dividing them into “rational” 
and “non-rational” approaches. Thus, the former are 
linked to the development of  the main current of 
economics (neoclassical), in which human behaviour 
is interpreted as being guided by an instrumental 
rationality that weighs the benefits of undertaking 
common action against the costs. Examples of this 
tendency include the theory of public choice set forth 
3 Social capital has been present in sociology for decades: Bourdieu 
(1980) and Coleman (1990) were already using the term in the 1980s, 
while Granovetter (1985) spoke of strong ties and weak ties and 
North (1990) developed his theory of institutions with contents 
very similar to what is now known as social capital. However, it 
was Putnam who placed it at the centre of the academic debate in 
the 1990s when exploring the role of civil society in determining 
disequilibria in regional development. In Latin America, the term is 
used in connection with ideas about forms of community development 
or partnership (Ruiz, 2004; Villar, 2003; eclac, 2007).
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by James Buchanan and Gordon Tulluck (1993) and the 
resource mobilization theory of Mancur Olson (1982). 
The second group, meanwhile, includes theories whose 
motives of action are based on logics much closer to 
the political sphere, as they encompass aspects such 
as socialization in early life (influence of culture, the 
family, etc.) as determinants of human actions rather 
than the cold decision-making of homo economicus. 
This group encompasses some neoinstitutionalist and 
culturalist theories.4
Taking Olson’s analysis, collective action is the 
outcome of the roles of groups and organizations that 
act as structures developed to protect the interests of 
their members.5 However, Olson does not relinquish the 
idea that there are selfish individual interests involved 
in the building of organizations, since this appears in 
principle to be an innate and ahistorical characteristic 
that does not clash with collective action, with rational, 
calculating actors seeking to improve their position by 
acting as part of a whole. In other words, the group 
is a common means to a particular end, and is not 
formed with a view to what others want. Although 
there may be some degree of common ground in the 
nature of  human groupings, however, the author 
distinguishes between large and small groups. He thus 
4 Functionalist sociology (Ritzer, 1993) recognizes collective action 
as an immediate response to State action constituting a kind of 
non-rational reaction.
5 It follows that if  this is not their goal, individual interests will be 
safeguarded by individual actions.
emphasizes that the pursuit of collective goods is a 
characteristic of large groups or organizations only 
and that the behaviour of individuals within these 
groups is analogous to behaviour under conditions 
of perfect competition, in the sense that the decision 
as to whether or not to participate in the group will 
have only a nugatory effect on its outcome.6
In this analysis, furthermore, the creation of 
large groups is determined by the transition from 
primitive societies with a low level of occupational 
specialization (and little consensus) to modern ones 
where work becomes more complex and the survival 
of the collectivity depends on the ability to join forces 
and coordinate movements.
This type of approach is open to a number of 
criticisms, however. Perhaps the most important one, 
where its application to the context is concerned, 
is that it treats social and political relationships as 
deriving from a teleological, evolutionist dynamic 
6 In keeping with economic tradition, Olson notes that the incentives 
to organize are not just economic; there are also social incentives 
that have to do with social acceptance and position, but that are 
individual and not collective goods. He adds that rational individuals 
do not participate in large groups unless they are coerced or 
encouraged by the prospect of some benefit. He recognizes, however, 
that the effectiveness of collective action may be jeopardized by 
“free-riding”, i.e., the presence of people who are in a position to 
benefit from the action of the group’s other members and do so 
without incurring the costs of participation.
In small groups, the situation is different. The share of the collective 
good enjoyed by each member of the group is significant and the 
actions of one can affect others’ level of provision.
TABLE 1
Evolution of collective demands
Type of  social demand General goals Specific goals
Materialist values (physical needs) Security - Strong armed forces
- Anti-crime efforts
- Maintenance of  order
Subsistence - Economic growth
- Employment
- Inflation




- Urban quality and 
landscape
- Ecological balance





Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of  J. Valles, Ciencia política: una introducción, Barcelona, Ariel, 2000, and R. Inglehart, 
The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.
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that presupposes burgeoning organizational vigour 
stimulated by high economic growth. Needless to say, 
a conclusion like this is reminiscent of the famous 
Kuznetz curve, as the early stages of  economic 
growth entail high and rising levels of  inequality 
and deficient organization, mitigated as improving 
living conditions give rise to a new style of leadership 
in which civil society organizes in the interests of 
renewed growth, improving income distribution in 
a context of diminishing State interventionism and 
some shift away from primary activities as a source 
of employment.
We should add that, according to this Westernizing 
vision, the atavistic ties of the extended family are an 
impediment to the “coming of age” discussed by Kant, 
preventing the consolidation of individuals who are 
independent and free to enter into contracts involving 
other individuals and organizations in situations that 
are symbolically different to those of their personal 
background. In poor countries with discontinuous 
growth, however, it would seem that a different 
analytical perspective is to be adopted.
Potentially, “non-rational” approaches (political 
logics) banish instrumentalist calculation, so that 
collective actions are guided by different considerations, 
including the quest for identity. Thus, what could be 
seen under an Olsonian perspective as a means becomes, 
in the approach of Touraine (1978), an end in itself. 
The point would rather seem to be to observe whom 
individuals come up against once mobilized and how 
they can then differentiate themselves, rather than the 
material ends they might attain.
Touraine (1978) expands his viewpoint by 
using three models to recreate the nature of social 
movements in Latin America: internal social conflicts, 
nationalism and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
action. With this approach, social movements are 
seen as the outcome, firstly, of protests at deficiencies 
in quality of life (housing, jobs, food security, public 
services, etc.) involving non-separation of the private 
and public spaces;7 secondly, of  far more general 
demands involving aspects such as the defence of 
public education and wages; and thirdly, of identity 
struggles for economic and political autonomy and 
of class confrontation, all of which come very close 
to the goals of guerrilla groups.
7 In the Greek tradition, basic needs of an economic character 
are met in the private sphere. The public sphere, meanwhile, is 
where politics is carried on, collective interests are discussed and 
individuals are recognized as equals in debate.
In Touraine (1978), social movements have the 
potential to transform the life of society by transcending 
the defence of  individual interests and affirming 
their specific ability to intervene in the formation of 
general policies and those aimed at defending the 
social body.
From this perspective, however, the prototypical 
organization supporting collection action does not 
seem to be one with strong and abiding organizational 
structures. Furthermore, it would seem that there is 
not much likelihood of an active civil society that 
promotes social capital being created in Latin America, 
not least because collective action is subordinated to 
institutions whose traditional political socialization 
norms ultimately mean that the course of collective 
action depends on the activities of the State, with this 
dependency thwarting their capacity for autonomy. 
Consequently, the very idea of the Kantian “coming of 
age” prevailing in liberal discourse, which assumes the 
existence of positive social capital, comes up against 
the cultural relativism that explains the individual 
as being subordinated to traditional institutions 
confined to the private realm; so that the vital spaces 
of social interaction cannot grow beyond what the 
family sphere permits.8
Consequently, the scope for extending social 
interaction, with acceptance of  the risk inherent in 
new contracts, is limited, something that is explained 
on the symbolic level by the influence of  the filial 
relationships of  the hacienda in the public sphere. 
Thus, derived political subcultures like patronage 
and caciquismo (the dominance of local party bosses) 
have moulded the administration of  the State, and 
in one way or another social movements end up 
under its wing, while the political elites (oligarchies) 
formed during the wars of  independence developed 
mechanisms of  social control which they perfected 
by exercising government until they could expertly 
control the pace of  events. A characterization that 
accords with this type of  approach, setting out from 
attributes such as the stability of their organizational 
structure, their pattern of  discourse and their field 
of  action, allows us to say that what Cauca has seen 
in recent times (the last two decades of  the twentieth 
8 In Putnam (2000), it is possible to distinguish between positive and 
negative social capital. The former generates civic virtues consistent 
with the expansion of the public space and the strengthening of 
social networks that give rise to formal institutions and economic 
progress, while the latter is conducive to the formation of closed 
circles that breed conspiracies and crime networks.
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century) has been the consolidation of  types of 
organization associated with the social movement 
category (Valles, 2000), where the conjunctions of 
interests and their permanence over time are far 
weaker than in other types of  organization such 
as interest groups and traditional political parties 
(see table 2).9
These are organizations (clubs, associations, etc.) 
of varying sizes that may eventually form networks 
and mobilize when the occasion arises. They do not 
9 An important characteristic of pressure groups is that they are 
recognized as voluntary associations whose main objective is to 
influence the political process by defending positions which affect 
the interests of a particular section of the community (wage workers, 
businesses, etc.). They pursue particular political objectives, but 
without aspiring to a general project of government (Galvis, 2005). 
Needless to say, the longer tradition of political parties and the 
academic attention paid to them does not necessarily mean that 
greater clarity can be assumed.
constitute a single organization and nor do they have 
an explicit programme of action, but they originate in 
a rejection of institutional channels and conventional 
ways of  expressing preferences. Accordingly, they 
engage in actions that range from mass sit-ins to 
direct action with some degree of violence, to civil 
resistance that involves breaking the law.10 It is also 
worth emphasizing that social movements combine a 
twofold logic in their goals and strategies (Valles, 2000, 
p. 341). First, they set themselves up as instruments 
of  participation within the political process and, 
second, they aim to achieve practical results from this 
activity by forcing themselves to make contact with 
the established power or confronting it for the purpose 
of negotiating and reaching agreements.
10  In all cases, very close attention tends to be paid to the media 
repercussions and the effects on public opinion.
TABLE 2
ideal typology of collective actors
Criterion
Type
Social movements Interest groups Political parties
Degree of  structuring Variable Strong, stable Strong, stable
Discourse Cross-cutting Sectoral Universal
Preferred field of  action Social, non-conventional Institutional, social Institutional
Source: J. Valles, Ciencia política: una introducción, Barcelona, Ariel, 2000.
IV
the history of mass action in Cauca
from 1990 to 2004
In Colombia, the creation of the Cauca Indigenous 
Regional Council (cric) and the National Association 
of Rural Users (anuc), in 1970 and the late 1960s 
respectively, exemplifies the importance of  mass 
action in the concert of regional development.11 But 
11 It is important to stress that the new forms of action, which replaced 
the old class struggle, made use of media representations like those 
seen in the case of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation 
(ezln) in Mexico and those that accompanied the Social Forum 
in Brazil. Furthermore, changes of this type favoured the growth 
does the fact that events of this type have taken place 
in the Department of Cauca imply the existence of 
of antiglobalization movements, which are advocates for global 
justice and equity as well as making ethnic and cultural demands. 
Examples include the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (mst) 
in Brazil, the piqueteros (members of the unemployed workers’ 
movement) in Argentina and coca growers in Bolivia. The groups 
leading action of this type have been formed of indigenous people, 
workers, landless campesinos and small producers who have fallen 
victim to the international competition that arose with the new 
market development model.
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Sebastián; the outcome was that they attained some 
of their objectives but also, among other things, that 
they created new associative resources not necessarily 
derived from guerrilla action.13
The penultimate decade of the twentieth century 
saw a kind of inflation where popular mobilization 
was concerned (see figure 1), coinciding with the 
introduction of  the first generation of  economic 
reforms following the shock unleashed by the external 
debt crisis of the 1980s. Halfway through the period, 
efforts were made to calm this as one presidential 
mandate gave way to another.
The culmination of the Government of César 
Gaviria, who had increased the pace of  economic 
reform, contrasted with that of  Ernesto Samper, 
who tried to check the impetus of his predecessor’s 
measures, giving the State a somewhat more forceful 
role in social investment.
However, the increasing difficulties of governance 
resulting from corruption scandals and the penetration 
of the political arena by drug traffickers seems to have 
corroded the legitimacy of institutions yet further, 
so much so that collective protest actions were able 
to continue and even increase, as could clearly be 
seen by the end of  the decade’s second four-year 
term of office. However, expectations of a ceasefire 
and the failed effort to reach a peace agreement with 
farc, which subsequently escalated its guerrilla 
and paramilitary activities, seem to have facilitated 
further implementation of the development model 
prevailing since the beginning of  the decade. This 
meant a consolidation of the conservative ideological 
hegemony that was carried over from the Government 
of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) to that of Álvaro 
Uribe (2002-2006) and has been extended with the 
re-election of the latter.
Institutional weakness seems to be borne out 
by the mathematical progression in the frequency of 
mobilizations from 1993 until 1999. Following the 
First Regional Civic Stoppage of  the Colombian 
Massif  between 20 and 26 August 1991 (see table 3), 
nine municipalities joined the struggle and a far wider 
array of demands was established.
13 The action only got as far as Guachicono and was named after 
it, as the negotiators preferred to restrain its advance towards the 
central highway.
social capital, as set forth by theory and evidence in 
Colombia and internationally?
Throughout its history, the Department of 
Cauca has seen a series of collective actions, most of 
them associated with the guerrilla insurgency, which 
then took a remarkable turn in the 1990s.12 In view 
of these and other demonstrations, Cauca has been 
identified (Cuéllar, 2000) as the greatest repository 
of this resource in Colombia.
This process became manifest with the first 
mobilization in 1987, although some municipalities 
had already experienced activity between 1980 and 
1985, examples being Santa Rosa, Bolívar and small 
towns such as El Rosal (San Sebastián), which 
decided to produce a “diagnosis” or list of  urgent 
needs (Jaramillo, 2003), giving rise to the stoppage 
in Bolívar in December 1985 and the one in Sucre 
in May 1986. But it was the 1987 march that set the 
area irreversibly on the road to a social movement of 
extraordinary proportions. Its demands centred on 
the need to complete the highway to Santa Rosa and 
improve the section already built, although the list also 
included other needs requiring resolution.
It was then that the Pan-American Highway began 
to be identified as an effective symbol of  struggle 
(Jaramillo, 2003; Tocancipá, 2004), once institutional 
channels had been exhausted and it had been shown that 
the ground rules imposed by the regime left no room 
for negotiations in government offices or bureaus but 
only in the spaces where forces came into conflict. The 
bulk of the marchers were from Santa Rosa and San 
12 Perhaps one of the first visible manifestations of the belligerency 
of the department arose in the 1910s with the indigenous uprising 
headed by someone who would become a leader of  mythical 
proportions, Manuel Quintín Lame (Jaramillo, 2003). Lame set 
his ethnic group against the hegemonically dominant values, 
turning it into a force to be reckoned with in power relationships. 
Later, his name would be used by a guerrilla faction that was most 
active in the 1980s.
It also became a focal point of armed confrontation as a result of 
the consolidation of the guerrilla insurgency experienced by the 
country from the late 1940s onward, which was given a further 
impetus by the Cuban revolution —so much so that the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (farc), the National Liberation Army 
(eln), the People’s Liberation Army (epl), the Comando Pedro 
León Arboleda, the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (prt), the 19 
of April Movement (M-19), the Jaime Bateman Cayón guerrilla 
group and the Quintín Lame, to name some of the major ones, 
had or still have a presence in the territory.
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In fact, 30,000 campesinos reached the Pan-
American Highway, at the Rosas site, but the clamour 
of  collective action began to die down, for after 
six months of preparation and after succeeding in 
negotiating with most central government officials, 
the resources of  the initiative collapsed. However, 
mobilizations were to continue on a lesser scale before 
picking up again in 1994. This period must have served 
to strengthen the arguments and instruments of the 
struggle against formal channels for conveying social 
demands. Four main elements linking the theoretical 
discussion to the statistical evidence should thus be 
emphasized:
i) The consolidation of secure identity moorings 
within the organization, reinforced by the 
construction of an external enemy beyond the 
wider (national and regional) society and its 
homogenizing development project.
ii) The strengthening of the movement as a space 
of  social recognition and the opportunity to 
construct and give vitality to the idea of territory 
and region.
iii) The validation of confrontation strategies to deal 
with public policy-making and implementation 
processes.
iv) The variable structuring of  the movement 
(campesinos,  indigenous  people  and 
Afrodescendants), but with a refinement of the 
discourse that is evident in the defence of regional 
coverage and symbolism, even with a minimal 
prioritization of the solutions being sought.
And indeed, the very scale of  the movement 
suggests a fairly advanced internal process. Jaramillo 
(2003, p. 23) has the following to say about this:
“The 1991 mobilization was quite remarkable. It 
showed a capacity for organization and mobilization 
that already pointed the way to its future actions. 
It was an action, indeed, that must be regarded not 
merely as such but as the outcome of an earlier effort 
to organize civil sectors in the countryside, teachers 
FIGURE 1
number of collective actions in the Department of Cauca, 1990-2002
Source: J. Agredo and L. Flórez, “Hacia una caracterización de las acciones colectivas en el Departamento del Cauca (1990-2002)”, 



















1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
TABLE 3
record of collective actions in the 
Department of Cauca
Year Number of  actions Mobilization index















Source: authors’ calculations based on information from J. 
Agredo and L. Flórez, “Hacia una caracterización de las acciones 
colectivas en el Departamento del Cauca (1990-2002)”, degree 
thesis, Popayán, University of  Cauca, 2005.
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and political activities from the municipalities 
directly integrated into the geographical area of 
the Colombian Massif. The pressure it applied led 
to an inevitable acceptance of it as an interlocutor 
by the State, allowing it to negotiate satisfactorily. 
An important lesson here, however, was that its 
ignorance of the internal management and work 
of State institutions meant that most of what it 
negotiated had already been budgeted for by the 
government of the day.”
Thus it was that, on 31 March 1991, the Committee 
for the Integration of the Colombian Massif (cima) was 
brought into being with the intention of progressing 
with four basic tasks: (i) fostering local and regional 
integration, (ii) holding the first cultural congress of 
the Massif, (iii) bringing out the regional newspaper 
and (iv) holding the first regional civic stoppage in 
the municipalities of the Colombian Massif.
In 1996, protest struggles briefly took a different 
path (Agredo and Flórez, 2005); the method used was not 
mass mobilization, but rather negotiations that included 
the Departments of Cauca, Huila and Nariño.
The idea of  the region as a recognized entity 
gathered force thanks to efforts such as the 
Environmental and Agricultural Development Plan 
for the Colombian Massif  and Southern Cauca, the 
comprehensive and sustainable production plan, the 
social harmony plan and the science and technology 
plan. This led to agreements on projects that were 
supposed to be implemented during 1996, 1997 and 
1998. At the same time, geographical coverage was 
widened with the inclusion of other municipalities 
that had not participated in the first mobilization, 
but that were close to the area of influence of those 
municipalities that had.
However, the effervescence of the mobilization 
seemed to die down into a period of lethargy. Three 
things might explain what happened. First, the 
members of  the organizations considered that the 
response of the State had met their expectations, and 
a phase of cooptation or collaboration with the latter 
began, something that is astonishing considering the 
far from distinguished position of the department as 
the country’s second-poorest. Another possibility is 
that the vigour of the anti-guerrilla struggle waged 
by Uribe’s Government and the proliferation of 
paramilitary groups discouraged mass mobilization 
and made organizations decide not to participate 
in events such as the seizure of the Pan-American 
Highway, for fear of  being treated like insurgent 
factions by the police. This kind of  thing cannot 
be ruled out, as paramilitary activity surged amidst 
talk of institutional order and restoring the State’s 
monopoly of force, with the consequent repression 
of many expressions of social protest. Third, it may 
have happened that ties of  integration within the 
overall organization weakened to such an extent that 
only organizations like cima and the Movement of 
Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (aico) came out 
adequately strengthened, whereupon they sought to 
keep out organizations seen as free riders.
Thus, having rid themselves of  bodies that 
benefited from the struggle with a minimum of effort, 
the more committed organizations moved on to new 
forms and methods of action, with the consolidation 
of national and international networks allowing them 
to create far stronger underpinnings of social capital 
embodying a more proactive, independent attitude 
towards the administration of  power. However, a 
hypothesis like this would mean accepting with Olson 
(1982) that it is more centralized and less deliberative 
(horizontal) organizational structures that subsequently 
create the bonds of trust which are the hallmarks of 
social capital.14 It also appears to have been accepted 
that their members should adopt a more instrumental 
stance to achieve their objectives. Perhaps as a result, 
collective actions became less and less spontaneous, 
with 84% of them resulting from more elaborate forms 
of organization during the period (see table 4).
All this would mean rejecting the Putnamian 
interpretation that identifies success in creating positive 
social capital with the existence of  decentralized 
horizontal organizations, which indigenous organizers 
appear to be drawn to, if the call for greater participation 
and the rejection of  the institutional channels for 
processing demands required by the verticality of 
public policymaking are anything to go by.15
Indigenous mobilization as such averaged just 
under four actions a year. The main motives of these 
actions were land recovery and the dishonouring of 
agreements.
14 In this analysis, the organizations traditionally considered to 
be vertical are basically unions, political parties and religious 
organizations.
15 According to Cuéllar (2000a), Olson sees horizontal organizations 
as a potential obstacle to economic growth if  they turn into 
interest groups in pursuit of preferential treatment that imposes 
disproportionate costs on society, i.e., when they are created on a 
basis of solidarity to conspire against the public good or restrict 
individual freedom or enterprise. Coleman (1990), finds that group 
“closure”, social norms that produce an effect of “externality” and 
the prospect of obtaining individual benefits in both vertical and 
horizontal organizations act as drivers of progress.
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TABLE 4
the indigenous movement







1991 3 Land Marches One day No agreement No
1992 4 Government policies Marches One day No agreement No
1993 1 Government policies Marches One day No agreement No
1994 2 Housing Sit-ins One day No agreement No
1995 3 Government policies Marches One day No agreement No
1996 5 Land Sit-ins 1 to 8 days Written agreements No
1997 2 Government policies Marches One day No agreement No
1998 5 Government policies Sit-ins One day Written agreements No
1999 6 Dishonouring of  agreement Blockades and roadblocks 2 to 8 days Written agreements No
2000 3 Dishonouring of  agreement Marches One day No agreement No
2001 4 Dishonouring of  agreement Blockades and roadblocks One day No agreement No
2002 6 Dishonouring of  agreement Blockades and roadblocks One day No agreement No
Total 44 Dishonouring of agreement
Source: J. Agredo and L. Flórez, “Hacia una caracterización de las acciones colectivas en el Departamento del Cauca (1990-2002)”, 
degree thesis, Popayán, University of  Cauca, 2005.
However, from 1997 to 2001, as increasing stress 
was laid on macroeconomic adjustment measures 
and the recovery of the coercive powers of the State 
(supported by illegal armies), the trend rose above 
the average, peaking at six a year. Thus, if  collective 
actions were refined going into the negotiating phase, 
the forms and methods employed throughout the 1990s 
were not abandoned. This confirms that while joint 
struggles declined, indigenous people were able to 
maintain the form if  not the pace of action (marches 
and roadblocks). Thus it seems they remained as the 
immediate objectives of ethnic recognition, contact 
and dialogue, taking advantage of the fact that the 
symbol of the external enemy had already been created 
and needed to be kept in view: the homogenizing 
economic model (Montoya, 2006) and the wider 
society separating them from the land. Meanwhile, 
their demands were practically reduced to two (land 
and compliance with agreements) and progress was 
made in consolidating cooperative associations to 
this end (see figure 2).
Campesinos meanwhile, having formerly allied 
themselves with the aboriginal inhabitants, now tended 
to distance themselves, partly because the greater media 
access of the regional elites, attuned to the philosophy 
of the political model propounded by the Government 
of President Uribe, gave currency to the idea that an 
agrarian counter-reform engineered by indigenous 
groups was gaining ground dangerously, the argument 
being that in their eagerness to recover land the latter 
would seize it not just from the old estate owners but 
from small proprietors too, and that the threat from 
the new “landlords” would have to be met by legitimate 
State violence in defence of private property. Again, 
the ethnic syncretism of  the campesinos, most of 
whom are of mixed race, displays cultural differences 
from indigenous people, involving different ways 
of understanding the market and economy and of 
placing the interests of the community above those 
of the individual. They differ even in their symbolic 
relationship with the land itself.
The whole of the foregoing analysis contrasts with 
the theory supported by international evidence and 
with Colombian studies like those of María Mercedes 
Cuéllar (2000). That author, who measures social 
capital by the frequency of participation in horizontal 
organizations, argues that in Colombia:16
16 In a similar study, Sudarsky (1999) questions methodologies of 
this type, as he regards civic participation as just one dimension 
of social capital. He argues that factors such as institutional trust, 
political cohesiveness and control of the State and of hierarchies 
by society are elements that Putnam disregards and Cuéllar also 
overlooks. He adds that vertical linkage produces greater social capital 
and that activities associated with the communications media are 
related to social capital, but trust in them is dependent on a second 
factor he calls “faith in unvalidated information sources”.
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“…The highest indices of associative activity are 
found, in this order, in the Departments of Cauca, 
Risaralda, Cundinamarca, the Capital District, 
Santander and Boyacá. Conversely, they are lowest 
in Guajira, Sucre, Quindío, Meta, Bolívar, Tolima, 
Caldas and Atlántico” (2000b, p. 28).
Nonetheless, the socio-economic conditions of 
the department and the dynamic of social mobilization 
evince major distortions. First, this type of analysis does 
not tie the idea of collective action to the generation of 
networks of cooperation between organizations, which 
we shall address later on. Second, the social capital 
concept transcends the social movement category, 
since while social mobilization efforts generated high 
levels of  organizational concentration and linkage 
in the early years of the decade, they fell off  at the 
end of the decade without any confirmation as yet 
that greater participation in associative bodies was 
instrumental in reducing poverty. It should be added 
that all social capital embodies a social movement, but 
not every social movement turns into social capital. 
What seems to have been achieved is the strengthening 
of indigenous organizations, but without any evidence 
that the process of identity agglutination served to 
consolidate cooperation networks within the civil 
society of the region.
Third, the strength of collective action has not 
served to bring civil society closer to the State either; 
the effect has rather been to consolidate indigenous and 
campesino identities around the rejection of institutional 
channels, with the effect that public policy outcomes 
have been generated through strategies of confrontation 
rather than cooperation. Nor has it been permitted by 
the conservative (integrationist) project, immersed as 
it has been in the planning of national and regional 
development, despite the formal spread of participation. 
Fourth, there is no symbiotic relationship between the 
action of social movements, social capital and income 
levels (Cuéllar, 2000). The most depressed sectors and 
places are those with the most collective actions. Fifth, 
the relationship between social movements, social 
capital and human capital does not prove significant, 
given that indigenous movements, which do not have 
the highest levels of schooling, have been the most 
consistent and persistent in their collective actions. 
This shows that formal education does not revitalize 
this relationship and that other types of knowledge 
may give a better idea of what is meant by a strong 
organization. Sixth, economic growth is neither a cause 
nor a consequence of social capital in the department, 
but it can be related to mobilization, while rejection 
of the impact of market orthodoxy has succeeded in 
generating regionally recognized actions.
FIGURE 2
Collective actions of the indigenous movement in Cauca, 1990s
Source: J. Agredo and L. Flórez, “Hacia una caracterización de las acciones colectivas en el Departamento del Cauca (1990-2002)”, 
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Although it is not possible to positively affirm 
the symbiotic relationship between social capital and 
social mobilization (action of movements), it is safe to 
say that they are the seeds of what this resource could 
represent for the region. Ultimately, the indigenous 
movement and the resulting mobilizations were the 
great beneficiaries of  this whole period. They have 
thus turned into an “organized social movement”, 
but it does not follow from this that social capital 
exists, at least as understood by classic authors 
such  as Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) or 
Coleman (1990).
V
the reliance on history in determining
social capital
It has not been possible to demonstrate the relationship 
between cultural factors and long-term economic 
performance clearly, owing to the endogeneity of 
the first variable (Durlauf  and Fafchamps, 2005). 
However, many authors see culture as affecting the 
development of political and economic institutions, 
which are the fundamental cause of  comparative 
differences in development levels.
The use of microanalysis to identify the underlying 
dynamic in a region is a simple tool, but one that has 
great explanatory potential when the municipality is 
taken as the unit of  analysis and the basis of  local 
development. We shall show the extent to which 
development levels in the different municipalities 
of  Cauca converged in the period from 1951 to 
2005, bearing in mind characteristics such as the 
presence of  indigenous culture or institutions of 
colonial origin.
Beta (or absolute) convergence takes place when 
poorer countries/regions or localities grow faster than 
wealthier ones. Sigma (or conditional) convergence 
takes place when the variance of per capita income 
among a group of countries/regions or localities tends 
to fall over time, until the poorest catch up with the 
wealthiest in per capita terms (Rey and Montouri, 
1998). Because there is no system of regional accounts, 
however, population growth was used as a proxy for 
economic growth, following the Tiboutina hypothesis 
that people emigrate from areas with lower levels of 
efficiency and social welfare to those that are better 
placed in terms of progress and the provision of public 
goods to take advantage of the greater availability 
of well-being and growth there, with the result that 
populations in the latter rise.
Six ordinary least squares (ols) regressions were 
run to estimate the following models:
(1) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + ε
(2) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + β2  *  Indigen + ε
(3) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + β2  *  Dummcol + ε
(4) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + β2  *  Indigen +
 β3  *  Dummcol + ε
(5) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + β2  *  Indigen +
 β3  *  Dummcol + β4  *  Estates + ε
(6) g = β0 + β1  *  LnPop0 + β2  *  Indigen +
 β3  *  Dummcol + β4  *  Estates + β5  *  DisPop + ε
where:
g is the population growth rate in the 1951-2005 
period.
LnPop0 is the natural logarithm of the population in 
the starting year (1951).
Indigen is the indigenous population per municipality 
in 1998.
Dummcol is a dummy variable used as a proxy for 
colonial origins, taking the value 1 if  the municipality 
was founded in the sixteenth or seventeenth century 
and 0 if the municipality was founded in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth or twentieth century.
Estates is the number of landed estates per capita in 
the municipality in 2002.
DisPop is the geographical distance in kilometres from 
each municipality to Popayán.
Model (1) shows the traditional beta convergence 
hypothesis, while the rest seek to capture the impact 
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and population growth rate in 1951 variables had 
negative signs, meaning that the smaller the number 
of landed estates per capita in the municipality, the 
shorter the distance from Popayán and the lower 
the growth rate in 1951, the more the municipality 
will develop. The colonial period variable proved 
to be of low significance in regressions 3, 4 and 5, 
showing that the fact of a municipality having been 
founded during the colonial period has no bearing 
on its level of development. This relationship changes 
when distance from Popayán is introduced in model 
6, where it becomes significant at 10%. Lastly, for a 
municipality to have a larger indigenous population 
proved to be a significant variable that positively 
affected development.
The average population growth rate of  the 
municipalities in the Department of Cauca during the 
different intercensal periods reveals a clear reduction 
in dynamism, as it declined from 84.64% in the 1951-
1964 period to 4.55% in 1993-2005 (see table 6). It 
would seem that until the 1960s the Department of 
Cauca presented a convergent inter-regional dynamic, 
understood as the need for faster growth to attain the 
growth levels of more developed municipalities.17 Since 
then, disparities seem to have increased.
17 This result agrees with that of Bonet and Meisel (1999), showing 
convergence for Colombia between 1960 and 1990 but total 
divergence from 1990 onward.
of  colonial history on the development of  the 
municipalities of  Cauca. In particular, Indigen, 
Dummcol and Estates are intended to reflect the 
colonial heritage on the theory that municipalities 
that were founded during the colonial period, with 
greater land concentration or a larger indigenous 
population or both, possess a greater colonial 
legacy that is capable of affecting their development. 
DisPop aims to measures the impact of  geography 
on municipal development, since Popayán is not just 
the capital of  the Department of  Cauca but is also 
on the Pan-American Highway, the main trunk road 
linking Cauca to the north and south of the country; 
it is possible that the further from Popayán a place 
is, the lower its level of  economic activity.
The results of the analysis in figure 3 show that, 
for the period being studied, the correlation between 
the rate of  population growth in the Department 
of  Cauca between 1951 and 2005 and the natural 
logarithm of population size in 1951 (start of  the 
period) tended to decline, indicating the presence of 
beta convergence, as is also shown by the estimated 
coefficient of correlation (–0.66). This process can be 
explained by migration between municipalities and 
accords with the results of Bonet and Meisel (1999), 
where Cauca is described as converging.
The results of the OLS estimations for the models 
formulated are presented in table 5. On the whole, the 
models do not have large specification biases.
Of the models regressed, the one with the best 
fit was model 6. The estates, distance from Popayán 
FIGURE 3
Department of Cauca: beta convergence in population dynamics, 1951-2005
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TABLE 5
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R2 0.444164 0.565114 0.458413 0.597406 0.618340 0.641107
Source: authors’ calculations based on information from the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute (igac) and the National 
Administrative Department of  Statistics (dane), population censuses.
N.B.: Ln PGR1951-2005: Natural logarithm of the population growth rate between 1951 and 2005.
Ln PGR1951: Natural logarithm of the population growth rate in 1951.
a The figures in parentheses below the regression coefficients are standard deviations. 
b The variable is significant at 5%. 
c P value in parentheses.
TABLE 6
Municipalities in Cauca: intercensal change in population growth rates  
Municipality pgr 1951-1964 pgr 1964-1973 pgr 1973-1985 pgr 1985-1993 pgr 1993-2005
Deviation: standard 105.9756685 25.33207284 28.35564532 39.50692188 23.3905385
 mean 84.64455714 16.94496384 12.44300049 38.04881357 8.363971579
 median 46.96828358 18.10022928 9.213949929 30.86376812 6.375710574
Variation coefficient 1.252008069 1.494961752 2.27884306 1.038322044 2.796582733
Source: authors’ calculations based on information from the National Administrative Department of  Statistics (dane), population 
censuses.
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The dispersion in population growth rates 
by municipality in the department bears out this 
hypothesis, as an increase in the dispersion of growth 
is observed for the 1964-2005 period compared to 
the same analysis for 1954-2005, whose coefficient 
of variation is greater.
The results also show (see table 6) that the decade 
from 1954 to 1964 was historically decisive for the 
compression of the population dynamic in Cauca and 
its development. During this period, the department 
experienced one of the most convergent episodes in its 
history, which coincided precisely with the agrarian 
reform process.
In summary, the statistics from the Department 
of Cauca show that the municipalities with the largest 
indigenous populations have experienced a higher rate 
of population growth. Furthermore, municipalities 
founded during the colonial period have better 
development prospects than those founded since 
independence if  they are closer to the departmental 
capital, which shows the influence of  colonial 
relationships with hierarchies close to the centre.
VI
Associative networks and density: elements
of public trust 
Since not all associativity embodies social capital, 
but there is no social capital without associativity, it 
is necessary to identify the precursors of this asset 
besides those already examined and establish their 
repercussions in terms of the coordination of demands, 
consolidation of networks and growth of trust.
A first step is to ascertain the extent of associative 
density. Thus, the number of civil society organizations 
in relation to the total population is a vital indicator 
if  these are the pillars on which networks generating 
cooperation and trust are being built. It should be noted 
that these claims are based on a qualitative analysis 
model applied by surveying civil society organizations 
registered with the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Cauca Governor’s Office up to 2006. Of the 3,951 
organizations registered with these two bodies, it was 
only possible to confirm that 2,035 were active. About 
300 units were then surveyed, the informant in most 
cases being the legal representative or someone of 
managerial level.18
The information thus obtained yielded a regional 
picture in which a central zone was home to the greatest 
number of organizations and saw a large number of 
social protest movements, built however upon the axis of 
departmental governance on the basis of relationships 
of  patronage that did not generate a high level of 
18  Respondents were chosen by simple random sampling. Because 
of  the difficulties of  connectivity and the difficult terrain, the 
interviews were carried out by telephone.
economic activity. Next comes a northern subregion 
that displays high levels of associative participation 
and density and the greatest economic dynamism, 
but that paradoxically functions as an enclave which, 
strikingly, has a relatively low distributive impact and 
which furthermore displays a high level of conflict and 
violence, both in the towns (particularly towards the 
border with the neighbouring Department of Valle del 
Cauca) and in the countryside, with struggles over land 
to the north-east. Then there is a southern subregion, 
with a recent upsurge of associative groupings seeking 
to improve their economic prospects on the basis of a 
campesino production structure. There is an eastern 
region with manifest problems of connectivity, where 
the social base is predominantly indigenous and social 
activity is oriented towards the recovery of identity 
and the voicing of social demands in the face of State 
neglect. Lastly, there is a western region located on 
the Pacific seaboard, also poorly connected, where 
the bulk of  inhabitants are black and the main 
economic activity is subsistence farming, although it 
has recently been colonized by industrial crops such 
as palm, introduced by a sizeable advance guard of 
businesses from the Andean region (coffee industry), 
existing side by side with illegal crops. It presents a 
low level of  associative activity and is in thrall to 
patronage networks, mingled with a paramilitary 
presence that has displaced the former dominance 
of guerrillas (see figure 4).
Thus, with connectivity inhibited by the rugged 
terrain and path dependency exacerbated by the 
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hegemony of patronage networks, governance is weak 
and the conditions are not conducive to the kind 
of political legitimacy needed for the coordination 
of  demands and collective action. Consequently, 
subregional divisions seem to threaten secessionist 
pressures, particularly in the northern region of 
Cauca, which has the greatest organizational density, 
followed by the Massif  region (see table 7), both of 
which are regions characterized by a large presence 
FIGURE 4
Associative density in Cauca (municipal)
(Per thousand people)
of ethnic, and particularly indigenous, groups. Civil 
society and social capital seem to be equally deficient 
as long-term resources for promoting sustainable 
growth together with improved income distribution 
and good governance.
Because patronage networks operate as a 
centrifugal force dispersing subregional interests, 
the competitiveness of  production structures is 
undermined in the absence of the contribution from 
TABLE 7
subregional density in Caucaa




Organizations as percentage of  regional 
total (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Subregional 
density
North 363 992 526 25.85 1.45
South 216 689 241 11.84 1.11
Centre 465 032 234 11.50 0.50
Bota Caucana 76 219 88 4.32 1.15
Massif 65 068 90 4.42 1.38
Pacific 154 236 114 5.60 0.74
East 76 219 88 4.32 1.15
Source: authors’ calculations.
a Subregional density shows the number of social organizations per 1,000 inhabitants in the different subregions of the Department 
of Cauca.
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an empowered civil society capable of supplementing 
and legitimizing the action of the State. Since what is 
at issue is a set of personal relationships operating as 
an extension of mutual assistance networks, it could 
easily be argued that this fits within the conceptual 
framework of social capital described in earlier sections 
of this paper, but it is a vertical, asymmetrical form 
of “individual social capital” growing from the east 
and promoted by indigenous groups as a form of 
“inward” social capital. Both seem to create a mixture 
of disjointedness and conflict, of the zero sum game 
type. However, there needs to be a closer examination 
of the way networks are created around programmes 
and projects to gain a better idea of the outlook for 
social capital in the department.
The results to some extent bear out the predictions 
of observations about path dependency and the shift 
in the tendency of mobilizations in the 1990s. Table 
8 reveals weak external social capital, with over 75% 
of  organizations acting privately; if  we recall the 
rent-seeking mechanisms employed since the heyday 
of the hacienda system and the nature of the mining 
industry, what is being reproduced, it seems, is the 
creation of organizations to act as rent seekers.
Looking at the lifespan of  organizations (see 
figure 5), we can establish that a bare 10% of them 
TABLE 8
Linkages with community activities, institutions or projects 





No 220 75.1 75.1 75.1
State institutions 49 16.7 16.7 91.8
Social institutions 24 8.2 8.2 100.0
Total 293 100.0 100.0  
Source: authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 5
Frequency with which social and civil organizations are created in Cauca, 2007
(Percentages)
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have been in existence for more than six years, meaning 
that most have had very little time to mature and 
establish the links needed to increase their production 
of collective goods. Furthermore, the few projects 
that are implemented as extensions of collaboration 
networks operate under the tutelage of  the State, 
which narrows the scope for expanding the public 
sphere. Naturally enough, given the development 
levels of the department, most organizations pursue 
objectives associated with primary activities (agriculture, 
stockbreeding, mining) and some others, examples 
being the promotion of housing schemes and ethnic 
recognition, even though most projects are coordinated 
with State activities (see table 9).
Just 22.5% of  organizations are involved in 
accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, only 
about 6.5% have at some time employed a popular 
participation mechanism like those provided for in the 
country’s constitution to defend some public interest 
cause, although almost 53% have received instruction 
or training in the matter. Despite everything, within 
organizations a majority (83.6%) declare that they 
trust the members of the group. This may be due to 
the marked homogeneity of membership, confirming 
the filial nature of these bodies (see table 10).
What is ultimately surprising, however, is that 
when asked whether they would be willing to part 
with 50% of the organization’s assets in the interests 
of undertaking a major project of public interest, most 
informants (62.1%) said they would (see table 11).
This question was of very particular interest, as 
it gave an indication of how far trust extended beyond 
the members of an organization. Considering how 
poorly resourced most organizations are, lacking even 
an office or a web page (about 80% of organizations), 
it is surprising that the bulk of them should have been 
willing to carry out such an act of altruism, because 
sound economic logic indicates that, as revenues and 
assets increase, so does the marginal utility for the 
public good of displaying greater generosity towards 
TABLE 9
Cauca: participation in accountability mechanisms




No 227.0 77.5 77.5 77.5
Yes 66.0 22.5 22.5 100.0
Total 293 100.0 100.0  
Source: authors’ calculations. 
TABLE 10
Cauca: trust among members




No 48.0 16.4 16.4 16.4
Yes 245.0 83.6 83.6 100.0
Total 293.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: authors’ calculations.
TABLE 11
Cauca: willingness to relinquish 50% of assets




No 111.0 37.9 37.9 37.9
Yes 182.0 62.1 62.1 100.0
Total 293.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: authors’ calculations.
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the community, so that having few resources ought 
to produce the opposite effect. On the basis of this 
finding, we can say that not all is gloom, as we have the 
explicit expression of genuine intentions to generate 
Putnam-style “civic republicanism”, the problem 
being that the informal ground rules exogenously 
determine outcomes that are undesirable from the 
social coordination standpoint. This is precisely 
what we see in the obstacles to their operations that 
organizations identify (see figure 6).
As figure 6 shows, after low incomes (29%) it is 
political habits and low levels of participation that 
trammel the scope for achieving a higher level of 
positive social capital, something that would translate 
into trust and economic well-being in the Department 
of Cauca.
FIGURE 6
Greatest obstacle for the organization
(Percentages)




















Social capital is becoming the missing link with the 
potential to change the concept of development and 
promote new forms of representation that generate 
circles of  productivity in particular sociocultural 
environments. Its dynamic makes it possible to produce 
strong associative ties that can provide a basis for 
sustainable growth. Nonetheless, its application in 
research involves a degree of complexity, as seen in 
the tension between the individual and collective levels 
of human behaviour.
In the case of Cauca, the diversity of organizational 
dynamics or social learning has given rise to groupings 
that act in competition or combination with other, 
traditional ones (parties or interest groups), forming 
social movements that have strong organizational 
structures but retain the same practices of affirming 
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group demands that do not necessarily represent social 
capital in a broad sense.
On this subject, it is important to stress that the 
relationship between collective actions and social capital 
is permeated exogenously by geographical factors and 
by the endogeneity inherent in institutional (historical) 
factors. This comes through in the divergence of 
economic performance. Nor is there sufficient evidence 
about the explicit link between the development of 
social mobilization and the generation of this kind 
of capital, given that the former derives from a desire 
for ethnic recognition and demands upon the State, 
while civil society organizations can rather be seen 
as appendages of the latter and not necessarily its 
opponents, which ties them in with the patronage 
practices bequeathed by colonial institutions. Where the 
two do coincide is in their lack of staying power over 
time and their limited ability to generate associative 
networks that transcend filial ties.
Meanwhile, indigenous communities (which to all 
appearances are the strongest group when it comes to 
mobilizations and protests) have generated mechanisms 
for reinforcing contracts by way of punishment and 
reputation that are fully functional within the ethnic 
groups concerned but wholly dysfunctional when it 
comes to strengthening the dynamic of intercourse 
with the rest of society. We are not unaware that the 
social relationships embodied in these groups have 
social capital characteristics; we conclude, however, 
that social relationships of this type are not conducive 
to development (at least, not without the intervention 
of non-local actors), political best practices and an 
improved role for the public administration.
In the Department of  Cauca, in fact, social 
organization is only really strong when applied to 
the construction of identity, and not when it comes 
to securing local public goods and better living 
conditions for the region, which are unquestionably 
key objectives for social capital. Although the right of 
civil society to self-determination requires obedience 
to the liberal principles of the rule of law, which are 
closely related to cultural diversity conjoined with 
the concept of citizenship, it cannot be at the cost of 
diminishing the population’s quality of life, although 
it may well banish the hegemonic discourses resulting 
in underdevelopment.
Lastly, the dichotomy between the structural 
determinism deriving from path dependence and the 
capacity of  public policies for transformation and 
change is a key implication that we would wish readers 
to bear in mind in their analysis. The discussion that 
has arisen around the exogeneity or endogeneity of 
the determinants of economic progress means there 
is an important role for the State in long-term socio-
economic organization, as well as for other political 
and social actors that are important in today’s world, 
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